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Abstract: The aim of this empirical study is to analyse the impact of Corporate Governance on 
Capital Structure Decisions in Saudi Arabian commercial banking sector. The components of 
corporate governance whose impact has been analysed on the capital structure are board size, 
independence of directors, ownership structure, ownership of management, board meetings. Multiple 
regression analysis, Correlation matrix and Descriptive Statistics is used to assess the relationship 
among corporate governance components and capital structure of Saudi commercial banks for the 
years 2010 and 2011. The results shows that ownership structure and board size are positively 
correlated which is coherent with most of the previous studies. Managerial ownership and board 
independence are negatively correlated and board meeting held in a year is also negatively correlated 
but is statistically insignificant. Moreover the study found that on average the Saudi banks uses 68 % 
debt capital. The research study is supposed to facilitate regulatory authorities like CMA for 
improving the implementation of rules and regulations in order to make corporate governance tools 
work more efficiently in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The research study evaluates the effects of 
corporate governance components on capital structure decisions of Saudi commercial banks. 
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Introduction 
Corporate governance is a widely researched topic in the literature due to the fact 
that many corporate scandals such as Enron, Asian financial crises and recent 
credit crunches occurred due to lapses in governance. Corporate governance is a set 
of rules and regulation through which an organization is directed and controlled. 
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Corporate governance describes the rights and responsibilities of all the stake 
holders in an organization. Structure of corporate governance consists of a wide 
range of practices, policies and foundations which include accounting standards 
related to fair financial disclosure, executive compensation, size and composition 
of corporate boards audit committees.   
Corporate governance of banks seems to be more important than other industries 
because the banking sector plays a crucial financial intermediary role in any 
economy, particularly in developing countries. Poor corporate governance of the 
banks can drive the market to lose confidence in the ability of a bank to properly 
manage its assets and liabilities, including deposits, which could in turn trigger a 
liquidity crisis and then it might lead to economic crisis in a country and pose a 
systemic risk to the society at large (Cebenoyan & Strahan, 2004; Basel Committee 
on banking supervision, 2008; Garcia-Marco & Robles-Fernandez, 2008). 
Therefore, it is important to examine the effect of corporate governance 
mechanisms in the banking sector. Research on corporate governance has tried to 
examine its impact of the financial performance of business entities (Rebeiz and 
Salameh, 2006; Fosberg and Nelson, 1999; Kenourgios et al., 2007). 
A lot of research work has been carried out about bank stability, accounting 
performance, efficiency, ownership structure, agency issues, board structure and 
even corporate governance as whole impacts on the performance of banks, but 
corporate governance and the performance in the country like Saudi Arabia the 
banking sector is remotely touched. Taking this fact into consideration this study 
focusses on the relationship between corporate governance and the capital structure 
decisions of Commercial banks Listed in Saudi Arabian Stock Exchange 
(TADAWUL). 
Corporate Governance in Saudi Arabia 
The crash of TADAWUL in 2006 and subsequent suspension of trading for two 
firms created a serious question about the usefulness of monitoring procedures that 
were supposed to protect the investors in the country. In response to these events 
and to further strengthen the investors‘ interests the Corporate Governance 
Regulation were designed and issued by the Capital Market Authority (CMA) in 
November the same year. These regulations comprises though the rules and 
standards that control the management of companies that are listed in TADAWUL 
to confirm their agreement with the best governance practices in order to safe 
guard the investors‘ rights. These directives addressed the issues of right of 
stockholders, disclosure requirements, boards of director‘s features and audit 
committees specifications. These regulations were taken from the best practices 
around the world with a point of view of their easy and flexible implementation in 
the Saudi companies in the later years. This flexibility created dissimilarities 




there are many voluntary requirements exist with regard to the implementation of 
corporate Governance regulations in the firms as the implementation of best 
practices are in the hands of chief executive and board directors which can create 
further agency issue in some cases. Although the Banking sector is strictly 
managed with regard to monetary regulations and international BASEL agreements 
but still the area ofCG requirements fulfilled by the sectors is under researched. 
This study is an effort in this direction to find out the impact and relationship of 
Corporate Governance on capital structure of Commercial banks in the country. 
 
Literature Review 
Corporate Governance and Capital Structure Decisions 
Corporate governance and capital structure relationship has been studied by a 
number of researchers such as Berger et al(1997) in which They Found positive 
relationship between board size and leverage level. Wen et al (2002) and Abor 
(2007) also found positive relation between board size and capital structure. Berger 
et al (1997) and Abor (2007) found positive correlation between board composition 
and capital structure. Wen et al (2002) found negative relation between number of 
external directors and leverage level. 
Many empirical studies have shown that some corporate governance features which 
have inﬂuence on the ﬁnancing decisions of Company include board size, 
Independent directors, ownership concentration and structure, ownership 
managerial control and meeting attended during the year (Anderson et al., 2004; 
Bokpin and Arko, 2009; Choe and Lee, 2003; Fosberg, 2004; Friend and Lang, 
1988, 2006; Mehran, 1992). All of the above mentioned components of corporate 
governance are briefly discussed below in the light of previous literature. 
Size of Board of Directors 
Most of the Researchers are of the view that effective and efficient board is vital to 
the success of a company. It is the responsibility of the board to provide strategic 
direction to ensure the company‘s development and maximize the shareholders 
wealth. Boardis also charged with the duty of supervising and monitoring the 
senior management of the corporation. In the view of Adams and Mehran (2003) it 
is easy for bigger board to effectively monitor the actions of management and to 
deliver better performance. While Lipton and Lorsch (1992) proclaims that large 
boards are less operative compared to small boards because the conflict and 
disagreement that can arise among the members. The available literature on board 
size and capital structure harvests mixed ﬁndings where Berger et al. (1997) found 
a signiﬁcant and negative correlation between board size and Financing decisions 
and Wiwattanakantang (1999) established that board size is negatively correlated 
with capital structure but this association is statistically insigniﬁcant. Anderson et 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                        Vol 10, no 2, 2014 
 
 54 
al. (2004) established the same relationship. On the contrary Abor (2007) and 
Bokpin and Arko (2009) found a signiﬁcant positive relationship between size of 
the board and capital structure of corporations. 
Independence of Directors 
Independent directors on the boards are more privileged as they are normally 
considered to have better knowledge, vision and Independence from management. 
If there are more independent directors it means they can monitor the actions of the 
management more closely and take appropriate actions specially in respect of 
implementing corporate governance regulations. 
The top managers face more dynamic checking when their performance is 
measured by independent or outside directors (Weisbach, 1988). There is another 
factor that with more needs for entrance to the capital market it is expected to have 
greater number of independent directors for the companies. 
There are mixed results yielded in the literature regarding board composition where 
Berger et al. (1997) have shown that debt is signiﬁcantly lower when a there is a 
low percentage of independent directors. While, Wen et al. (2002) stated a 
signiﬁcant negative relationship between board composition and capital structure 
that means the managers are reluctant to take more loans in presence of more 
independent directors. This negative association is also found between board 
independence and leverage by Anderson et al. (2004). In another study Abor 
(2007) established a positive correlation between debt and independent directors 
while Bokpin and Arko (2009) found a positive and insigniﬁcant relationship 
between board independence and the leverage in the company. 
 
Ownership Structure 
The ownership concentration may also help to alleviate the agency problems 
between managers and stockholders. Many institutional investors and large 
shareholders have more ability than ordinary shareholders to inﬂuence the 
managerial decisions and actions. According to Brailsford et al. (2002) there is 
statistically signiﬁcant relationship between ownership concentration and capital 
structure with respect to debt financing and Fosberg (2004) established that the 
amount leverage in the capital structure is directly related to the proportion of 
ownership structure and concentration. Mehran (1992) stated a positively 
statistically signiﬁcant correlation between ownership by large investors and debt 
in the firm. 
Ownership of Management 
Research studies have found diverse outcomes about the relationship between 




found a positive and signiﬁcant relationship between debt capital and CEO‘s 
ownership telling that managers whose ﬁnancial benefits are associated with 
external stockholders will adopt more debt capital structure to raise the worth of 
the organization. 
Mehran (1992) also found a positive correlation between managerial ownership 
and capital structure proposing that ownership in company induce the manager to 
increase firm debt capital. Organizations with higher managerial ownership have 
more debt capital than firms with lower managerial ownership (Kim and Sorensen, 
1986). A study conducted by Brailsfordet al. (2002) found that the correlation 
between managerial ownership and debt capital could be nonlinear if the 
managerial ownership decreases the agency conflicts will reduce, arising a higher 
debt capital. But if the management already hold a significant ownership of firms‘ 
equity, then an increase in managerial ownership will lead to more managerial 
opportunism and it will cause lower debt. 
Some studies such as Wiwattanakantang (1999), Bokpin and Arko (2009) found 
insignificant relation between ownership and capital structure, while others such as 
Bathala et al. (1994) negative relation between managerial ownership and capital 
structure. 
Methodology  
Total population of listed commercial banks which consists of 10 banks Listed in 
Saudi Arabian stock exchange (Tadawul) is selected for this study. The study 
covers two years data from 2010 and 2011 to study the impact of Corporate 
Governance components on capital structures of the listed banks. In the model the 
capital structure of the commercial banks is taken as a dependant variable while 
components of corporate governance are taken as independent variables. Various 
components of Corporate Governance which were in inculcated in this study 
include Board Size and Independence, Ownership structure the ownership of 
Management and meetings held during the year.  
To calculate the dependant and independent variable following reliable measures 
have been used to find the relationship of Corporate Governance and Capital 
structure. 
Capital Structure of banks= Total Liabilities- Current Liabilities/ Total Assets –
Current Liabilities 
Board size= the Number of Directors in the bank 
Independence =Non-executive directors/ Total number of Directors 
Ownership Structure= Top shareholders / Total number of shares outstanding 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                        Vol 10, no 2, 2014 
 
 56 
Ownership of Management= Share held by board members and their close relative/ 
Total number of shares outstanding 
Board Meetings Held = Meeting held during the year 
The data was collected from the Audited Annual reports of the banks and an 
analysis was conducted on the basis of above mentioned criteria. Following 
Hypothesis has been developed to study the relationship. 
H1: there is a strong effect of Corporate Governance on Capital Structure of 
commercial banks in Saudi Arabia. 
H0: there is a weak effect of corporate governance on capital structures of 
commercial banks in Saudi Arabia. 
The Empirical Model: 
Multiple regression approach of OLS model is applied to find the strength of the 
above mentioned hypothesis. Panel data was used to decrease the chances of error 
and to improve the overall efficiency. 
The model is as under: 
CSB=β0+β1BS+β2I+β3OS+β4OM+β5BMH+Ɛi 
The Model denotes that intercept is β0 having a fixed effect on capital structure 
while Ɛi is the standard error in the model. CSB is the dependant variable used in 
the above model.The coefficients of independent variables are from β1 to β5 while 
BS, I, OS, OM and BMH are independent variables in the model. 
In order to better explain the required relationship the study uses the correlation 
matrix and descriptive statistics by using the Excel Spread sheet. 
 
Results and Analysis 
The table1 below shows the results of multiple regression analysis. The OLS 
Model gives the coefficient of determination R square which is equal 57.6% which 
means a reasonable proportion  
Of dependant variable (Capital structure of banks, CSB) is explained by 
Independent variables (BS, I, OS, OM and BMH). The overall significance of the 
regression model which is measured by F –statistic shows relatively weak about 
48% of regression results can be by chance. Moreover the Probability values or P-
values are above the significance level of 5% which shows weak relationship 
between dependant and independent variable. This is also evident from the smaller 
values of t Statistic. While the beta coefficients shows some positive and negative 




The table 2 is about the correlation matrix which tells the individual relationship 
among various variables of the study. The results show that only Ownership 
Structure and Board size are positively correlated with the capital structure of 
banks. While Independence, Managerial ownership and Board meetings held are 
negatively correlated with the dependant variable. Ownership structure has a 
significant positive correlation with Capital structure of the banks as 1 unit change 
OS will lead to more 40% change in capital structure while 1 unit change in board 
independence will negatively affect the capital structure by almost 50%. The 
correlation between OS and OM Has a very high negative correlation which means 
the ownership structure is negatively affected by increase or decrease in ownership 
of management. 
In Table 3 the summary of descriptive statistic is mentioned which has the some 
key information. On average the banks uses 68% debt to finance its operations. It is 
quite low when compared to international standards where it is more than 80% for 
banking industry. This is due to bank Al Rajhi An ALINMA where both the banks 
uses more equity finance, Al Rajhi has 65% and ALINMA has 76% of equity 
financing generally due to support its Islamic banking operations. 
Board Size consists of 10 members on average. Board Independence is about 41%. 
The Ownership structure shows 51% shares are held by few large shareholders 
mostly institutional investors. The Ownership of Management is about 13% which 
is high due to al Rajhi bank having more than 40% of control of its own board 


















This research study tried to find the effects of corporate governance on the capital 
structure of all the ten listed commercial banks of Saudi Arabia for the years 2010-
2011. Capital Structure (total debt-current liabilities/total asset-current liabilities) is 
taken as a dependent variable while corporate governance components are taken as 
independent variable, which include board size, independence of board, ownership 
structure, ownership of management and board meeting held in a year. 
The results shows that ownership structure and board size are positively correlated 
which is coherent with most of the previous studies. Managerial ownership and 
board independence are negatively correlated and board meeting held in a year is 
also negatively correlated but is statistically insignificant. Moreover the study 
found that on average the Saudi banks uses 68 % debt capital. The average is low 
because bank Al Rajhi and Bank Alinma uses mainly equity capital. About 51% 
shares in Saudi commercial banks are held by large mainly institutional owners. 
Furthermore the study reveals that 13% shares in Saudi commercial banks are held 
by the management and their close relatives, again it relatively high due to Bank Al 
Rajhi. The findings suggest that more studies should be conducted to investigate 
the weak relationship between corporate governance and capital structure in Saudi 
banks and more variables for corporate governance such as role of Committees, 
auditor independence, foreign ownership and minority ownership should be added. 
The study has limitations especially regarding data availability which covers two 




There are also some policy issues that should be addressed on the basis of this 
study about the extent and nature of the regulation of the corporate governance in 
banking sector of Saudi Arabia by CMA and other regulatory bodies like Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA). The empirical findings state to there is 
insignificant relationship between corporate governance and capital structure that 
suggests more regulations are required so that corporate governance can play 
appropriate and desired role in the commercial banking sector of Saudi Arabia. 
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